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ESSAYS
A SHORT HISTORY OF SEX AND CITIZENSHIP:
THE HISTORIANS’ AMICUS BRIEF IN
FLORES-VILLAR v. UNITED STATES
KRISTIN A. COLLINS∗

The historians’ amicus brief that follows was submitted to the Supreme
Court in Flores-Villar v. United States, an equal protection challenge to federal
laws that regulate the citizenship status of foreign-born children of American
parents.1 Children born in the United States are citizens by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, but the citizenship of foreignborn children of American citizens is governed by federal statute.2 When the
parents of such children are unmarried, those laws significantly encumber the
ability of American fathers to secure citizenship for their children, while
providing American mothers with a nearly unfettered ability to do the same.
The general question before the Court in Flores-Villar – and a question that the
Court has addressed in sum and substance on two other occasions during the
last thirteen years – was whether the gender-asymmetry in this statutory
scheme is consistent with constitutional sex-equality principles.3

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Boston University. My thanks to several colleagues who
read early versions of this introductory essay and offered helpful comments: Khiara Bridges,
Christopher Capozzola, Nancy Cott, Linda Kerber, Linda McClain, Virginia Sapiro, and
Rogers Smith. Any errors are mine.
1 Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764 (U.S. June 13, 2011)
(per curiam).
2 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2006).
3 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424
(1998). Nguyen and Miller involved challenges to the father-only legitimation and proof of
paternity requirements of 8 U.S.C. §1409(a)(4) and 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1970), while Ruben
Flores-Villar challenged the disparate parental residency requirements that apply,
respectively, to fathers and mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children. Compare 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1409(a), 1401(a)(7) (1970), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1970). Although Congress reduced
the duration of the parental residency requirement for nonmarital fathers in 1986, the statute
continues to hold mothers and fathers to different standards. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409(b),
1401(g) (2006), with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006).
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In a 4-4 decision issued as this essay was going to press, the Court declined
to answer this question, affirming the lower court’s decision without opinion.4
This result leaves the question presented in Flores-Villar an open one that the
Court may wrestle with again soon. It is all the more pressing, then, that we
attend to the history of sex-based regulation of citizenship, and consider how
that history illuminates the discriminatory practices that persist in modern
citizenship law.
***
Ruben Flores-Villar was born in Mexico to an American father and a
Mexican mother.5 Ruben had serious health problems as a newborn, and, with
his mother’s blessing, his father and paternal grandmother (also a U.S. citizen)
brought him to the United States for medical treatment.6 Ruben was raised
from infancy in his father’s American household, and had little if any contact
with his mother.7 Nevertheless, according to federal statutes that govern
derivative citizenship, Ruben is not a U.S. citizen.8
To secure citizenship for Ruben, his father had to establish paternity and
legitimate Ruben before he turned twenty-one, and prove that he (the father)
had lived in the United States for a total of ten years, five of which must have
been after he turned fourteen but before Ruben was born.9 When Ruben’s
citizenship was questioned by immigration officials, his father could show that
he had legitimated his son as required, but he could not satisfy the parental
residency requirement. As he was only sixteen when Ruben was born, he
could not possibly have lived in the United States for five years after he turned
fourteen but before his son’s birth.10 Under otherwise identical circumstances,
were Ruben’s mother the American parent, Ruben would unquestionably be an
American citizen. Indeed, in that case, even had Ruben lived his entire life in
Mexico, he would be an American citizen as long as his mother could satisfy a
4

Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764. Justice Elana Kagan was recused from
the case, as she had signed the brief opposing Flores-Villar’s petition for a writ of certiorari
while serving as Solicitor General of the United States. Brief for the United States in
Opposition, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.
5 Brief for Petitioner at 1, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 2-3.
8 The term “derivative citizenship” as used here refers to an individual’s acquisition of
citizenship by virtue of his or her familial relationship to a citizen.
9 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a) (1970). Ruben Flores-Villar’s citizenship status is
governed by the 1970 version of sections 1401 and 1409. See United States v. Flores-Villar,
497 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2007). In 1986, Congress added several requirements
to the statute governing citizenship transmission between fathers and their nonmarital
children, but shortened the parental residency requirement applicable to unmarried citizen
fathers to five years, two of which must have been before he turned fourteen but before the
birth of the child. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99653 § 12, 100 Stat. 3657 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2006)).
10 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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single and relatively undemanding requirement: she must have lived in the
United States for one year at some point in her life.11
At first blush, the laws challenged in Flores-Villar are not easy to place
within current debates concerning citizenship or sex equality.
Like
immigration and naturalization statutes, the laws that govern derivative
citizenship are expressions of the polity’s power to determine who is a formal,
rights-bearing member. But derivative citizenship laws do not involve
“naturalization” in any traditional respect: the child who qualifies as a citizen
under these laws is not considered a stranger to the nation who must shed one
citizenship to don another.12 Rather, he or she is considered a citizen at birth,
and no ceremonial attestation of national allegiance is required.13 Thus, the
laws that were at issue in Flores-Villar secure a form of birthright citizenship –
a right to citizenship by virtue of a circumstance or condition in existence at
the time of an individual’s birth – but not jus soli birthright citizenship, which
is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, and is
frequently in the news today.14
As a constitutional sex-equality case, Flores-Villar concerned statutes that
indisputably qualify as legislation by sex-based classification, thereby raising

11

See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1970). Justifications for this sex-based system of citizenship
laws have evolved over the decades. In Flores-Villar, the federal government urged that the
more favorable treatment of the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers was and
is justified because of such children’s greater risk of statelessness. See Brief for the United
States at 38, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764. This contention lacks support
in both historical and modern sources. See infra Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of
History, Political Science, and Law in support of Petitioner, Flores-Villar v. United States,
at 1512-15 [hereinafter Brief of Professors], reprint of Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of
History, Political Science, and Law in Support of Petitioner at 32-37, Flores-Villar, No. 095801, 2011 WL 2297764; Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of
Petitioner at 7-27, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, 2011 WL 2297764.
12 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 475 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
14 In the United States the phrase “birthright citizenship” is used to refer to the
constitutional right of “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof,” to U.S. citizenship. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Globally and
historically, however, there are two types of “birthright citizenship”: jus soli and jus
sanguinis. Common law countries have tended to follow jus soli, which recognizes the
child’s place of birth as the source of birthright citizenship. By contrast, civil law countries
have tended to follow jus sanguinis, which recognizes the parents’ (or, historically, the
marital father’s) citizenship as the source of birthright citizenship. See generally Richard
W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 545-46 (1921). For
recent news accounts of efforts to reinterpret or repeal the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guaranty of jus soli citizenship, see, for example, Mark Lacey, Birthright Citizenship Looms
as Next Immigration Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at A1; George Will, An Argument to
Be Made About Immigrant Babies and Citizenship, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2010, at A15.
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doubts as to their constitutionality.15 But at first glance, Flores-Villar did not
immediately raise any of the principal concerns that have tended to occupy
gender equality activists in recent decades, such as women’s exclusion from
the upper echelons of education, workplace equality, violence against women,
or the privileging of heterosexual coupling.16 Although the case surely
concerned men’s and women’s respective roles and rights as parents (a subject
that the Court has wrestled with in more than one equal protection case in
recent decades), by privileging unwed mothers and their children, the
challenged statutes present an unusual departure from maternalist legislation
that, in its most generous forms, has favored married women and mothers.17
In short, Flores-Villar appears almost esoteric in the issues it raised. Some
might conclude, therefore, that outside of the relatively small class of
individuals in Ruben’s situation, the case’s primary significance was its
potential to create bad precedent.18 But if sex-based derivative citizenship
laws seem difficult to place among our modern constitutional concerns, that is
in part because our constitutional sensibilities are themselves historically
15

See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (“Classifications
based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone
for pervasive and often subtle discrimination.”).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996); United States v.
Morrision, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621-22 (2007); Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
17 “Maternalist” regulations provide legal protection and financial support for women as
mothers, and have tended to favor married over unmarried mothers. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 201 (1988); Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based
Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV.
1085, 1089-90 (2009). This is not to suggest that unwed mothers have not enjoyed some
minimal government support, see Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996), or greater recognition of their parental rights in
contrast to unwed fathers, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). But much of
the maternalist legislation subject to equal protection challenge has privileged women as
wives and married mothers. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 201 (1977);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 678-79 (1973). By contrast, historically the laws governing derivative citizenship
significantly limited married mothers’ ability to transmit citizenship relative to both
unmarried mothers and married fathers. See infra Brief of Professors, at 1501-06 (original
at 9-19).
18 In particular, the concern was that, if the laws at issue in Flores-Villar survived
constitutional scrutiny, the Court would issue an opinion that either weakened the robust
standard of judicial scrutiny for sex-based classifications announced in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996), and/or expanded the plenary powers doctrine that limits
judicial review in some immigration law cases. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977).
Athough the 4-4 tie left the gender-asymmetrical citizenship laws in place, it averted both of
these results.
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conditioned. Were we living in the 1920s and 1930s, our sensitivities
regarding such laws would likely be quite different. Newly armed with the
vote, first-wave feminists lobbied Congress for decades to equalize our
citizenship laws, including the predecessor policy of the laws challenged in
Flores-Villar. Early twentieth-century feminists were acutely aware of the
practical and symbolic significance of sex-based citizenship laws and would
have had no difficulty explaining how those laws were part of this nation’s
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”19
An important goal of the historians’ amicus brief filed in Flores-Villar is to
recuperate that understanding by explaining how this ostensibly obscure
citizenship law is part of a larger historical phenomenon: the persistence of
gender-based sociolegal norms in determining citizenship. Over the last
twenty years, scholars working in different fields have examined the various
ways in which entrenched beliefs about men’s and women’s social roles and
capacities have shaped, and continue to shape, the conditions under which
individuals have been recognized as American citizens in the most minimal
sense of that term.20 Several of the books and articles that examine this
phenomenon from a historical perspective are the product of the individual
efforts of the eight signatories of this amicus brief: Kerry Abrams, Candice
Bredbenner, Christopher Capozzola, Nancy Cott, Linda Kerber, Virginia
Sapiro, Rogers Smith, and me. I am the principal author of the brief, but all of
the signatories played an active role in its production, reading multiple drafts
and providing detailed, nuanced comments. From start to finish, Linda Kerber
and Kerry Abrams provided enormously helpful counsel regarding strategic
and historiographic considerations, and they were intimately involved in the
nitty-gritty research, helping me to review thousands of pages of legislative
history. Lindsay Harrison, of Jenner & Block in Washington, D.C., brought
her considerable talents as an appellate litigator to the task as well, and that
firm generously provided the resources – human and financial – necessary to
finalize, print, and file the brief.
The production of the historians’ amicus brief in Flores-Villar presented an
unusual opportunity for a group of scholars with shared interests and
complementary expertise to think collectively about how the past should

19

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684).
In addition to the articles and books authored by the signatories of the brief and cited
infra and in the amicus brief that follows, see, for example, MARTHA GARDNER, THE
QUALITIES OF A CITIZEN: WOMEN, IMMIGRATION, AND CITIZENSHIP, 1870-1965 (2004); MAI
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
(2004); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2005). For an examination
of gender’s continuing relevance in U.S. citizenship and immigration laws, see Kerry
Abrams, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage, Immigration, and Assimilation, in GENDER
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 39 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna
L. Grossman eds., 2009).
20

1490

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91: 1485

inform the way we assess sex-based regulation of citizenship today. As the
product of these efforts, the brief simultaneously contributes to our
understanding of why gender continues to shape American citizenship law and
attempts to further a nearly century-long quest for sex equality in that
regulatory field.
***
There is no question that, historically, America’s citizenship laws were
shaped by the kinds of beliefs about men’s and women’s relative capacities
and roles that our modern constitutional sex-equality doctrine is intended to
repudiate. Over the course of the late-Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,
Congress steadily incorporated the gender-asymmetrical premises and
principles of contemporary marriage law into federal citizenship statutes.21 In
particular, derivative citizenship among family members was regulated
according to the concept of “marital unity” – the notion that “the husband and
wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage . . . .”22 Following that principle and
the related concept that the husband was the “head” of the family, within
marriage American men were recognized as the source of citizenship for their
foreign-born children starting in 1790; by 1855, they were the source of
citizenship for their foreign wives as well.23 Meanwhile, American women’s
subordinate and dependent status in marriage was reinforced by citizenship
laws that denied their ability to secure citizenship for their foreign-born
children and by the Expatriation Act of 1907, which stripped women of their
U.S. citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner.24 Outside marriage, the opposite
sex-based pattern prevailed with respect to parent-child derivative citizenship.
Our citizenship laws and policies have long recognized mothers as a source of
citizenship for their nonmarital children, while barring or severely limiting
derivative citizenship as between fathers and their nonmarital children.25
If this elaborate matrix of sex-based citizenship laws seems largely foreign
to us today, it is not because the “natural” processes of legislation led to the
gradual shedding of antiquated notions of men’s and women’s rights and roles
from those laws.26 In fact, one of the striking features of the development of

21

See Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 18301934, 103 AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1442-43 (1998); Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13 POL. & SOC’Y
1, 5-9 (1984).
22 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
23 See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat.
604; infra Brief of Professors, at 1500 (original at 6-7).
24 Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228.
25 See Kristin A. Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Were Mothers’ Duties: The
Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672-74 (2000).
26 Thus, consistent with Rogers Smith’s analysis of the development of citizenship law in
the United States, we cannot assume that the story of sex and citizenship law is a
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our citizenship laws – and a point emphasized in the amicus brief – is how
legal concepts like “marital unity” and male headship were reinforced and
preserved in federal citizenship statutes long after they were abandoned and
repudiated in other sociolegal contexts.27 Rather, the dismantling of much of
this system of sex-based citizenship regulation is attributable to the efforts of
first-wave feminists who, operating domestically and internationally, worked
tirelessly for sex equality in that field.28
Women’s organizations achieved an important success with the Cable Act
of 1922, which partially repealed the Expatriation Act of 1907, and thus
ensured at least some women’s right to retain their American citizenship upon
marriage to a foreigner.29 But that legislative victory was incomplete.
Particularly relevant in this case, despite feminists’ best efforts, the Cable Act
did nothing to ensure sex equality as between American mothers and fathers
who sought to secure citizenship for their foreign-born children.30 After
twelve more years of persistent lobbying by women’s organizations, in 1934
Congress finally equalized parent-child derivative citizenship with respect to
married citizen mothers and fathers, at least as a formal matter.31 But in the
1930s, Congress rejected bills that would have extended the sex-equality
principle to unmarried mothers and fathers.32 Today, derivative citizenship as
between mothers and their nonmarital foreign-born children remains virtually
unfettered, while fathers of such children are both burdened and protected by
an elaborate set of statutory requirements, including the age-calibrated parental
residency requirement at issue in Flores-Villar.
***

progressive narrative about America’s natural, linear movement away from “feudal”
hierarchies and practices toward full realization of its core liberal-democratic commitments.
See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
15 (1997).
27 See infra Brief of Professors, at 1501-06 (original at 9-19).
28 CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 1-14 (1998).
29 Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch. 411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. The Cable Act’s
partial repeal of the Expatriation Act of 1907 was and is rightly heralded as one of the first,
and most important, post-Nineteenth Amendment victories for women’s organizations. See
KRISTI ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL POLITICS BEFORE
THE NEW DEAL 27 (1996). However, the Act’s limitations were numerous, including – as
discussed below – its creation of race-based exceptions to married women’s citizenship
rights. See infra discussion accompanying notes 33-39.
30 See Cable Act, ch. 411, § 2; BREDBENNER, supra note 28, at 168.
31 Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797, 797-98. For a discussion of how Congress
undermined the sex equality achieved in the 1934 Act by creating gender-salient exceptions
that benefitted married fathers, see infra Brief of Professors, at 1504-06 (original at 15-18).
32 H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. (1930); S. 3, 71st Cong. (1930); H.R. 5489, 72d Cong.
(1931); see also infra Brief of Professors, at 1508-09 (original at 23-25).
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The amicus brief provides a much more detailed account of this history, but
– as the name of the genre implies – it, too, only summarizes the complex ways
in which our citizenship laws have been shaped by gender ideology. In
addition, the amicus brief is a legal advocacy document that must foreground
the facts and analyses judged to be most salient and persuasive in this
particular case. I have been asked how these generic limitations and
conventions influenced the amicus brief’s presentation of the history of sexbased citizenship laws. Two issues immediately come to mind.
The first is the amicus brief’s limited discussion of the many troubling ways
in which our sex-based citizenship laws have operated in a race-salient
manner. The history of U.S. citizenship law cannot be understood without due
recognition of racism’s central role in shaping the entire regulatory field. The
amicus brief is not silent on the subject of race. For example, it discusses how
the Cable Act left intact formal race-based restrictions on married women’s
citizenship rights by continuing to expatriate American women who married
foreign men “ineligible for citizenship” – a reference to the statutory exclusion
of Asians from immigration eligibility.33
But race-based beliefs also influenced – and continue to influence – the
operation of the formally race-neutral laws that were at issue in Flores-Villar.
Limitations on citizenship claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital
foreign-born children of American fathers highlight the troubling practice of
sexual exploitation of non-white foreign women by white American men. If
this suggestion strikes some readers as speculative, consider the statement of
Edwin Borchard, one of the most well-respected citizenship law experts of the
early Twentieth Century, who in 1912 uncritically declared that it “seems clear
that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries of American
fathers and native women are not American citizens.”34 That quote is included
in the amicus brief – and one hopes its significance was not lost on the brief’s
most important readers – but there is much more that could be said on this
general point.
To take one example, contrast the United States’s welcoming treatment of
children born to American soldiers and their European “war brides” during
World War II, and its resistance to marriages between American soldiers and
their South East Asian girlfriends during the Korean and Vietnam wars. As
Susan Zeiger has demonstrated in compelling detail, the difference between

33

Cable Act, ch. 411, §§ 3, 5, 42 Stat. 1022; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39
Stat. 874, 876; infra Brief of Professors, at 1503 (original at 12-13). When the Cable Act
was enacted, the statutory category of persons “ineligible for citizenship” also included
anarchists, polygamists, and a host of others. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39
Stat. 874, 875-77. Kerry Abrams explores the ways that race and sex-based ideologies
intersect in federal immigration law in Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 643, 677 (2005); see also Volpp, supra note 20,
at 411-19.
34 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 612 (1915).
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these two historical moments lay not just (or even) in the private conduct of
American soldiers, but also in the official policies and practices of the U.S.
government.35 During and following World War II, the military encouraged
soldiers to wed their European sweethearts, and Congress provided the
soldiers’ non-Asian war brides and children with special immigration status
through the “war brides” acts and transport to the United States.36 Meanwhile,
the military thwarted marriages between soldiers and their Asian girlfriends
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, instead encouraging and facilitating
casual sexual liaisons.37
The impact of these policies was not absolute. Many American soldiers
serving in Korea and Vietnam ignored their commanders and eventually
brought home wives and children who became American citizens.38
Nevertheless, the military’s race-salient policies operated in conjunction with
gender-asymmetrical derivative citizenship laws: the predominantly white
babies of World War II soldiers became citizens and “baby boomers,” while
the vast majority of nonmarital Amerasian babies were excluded and became
“children of the dust.”39
Any complete analysis of the legal and historical significance of sex-based
laws governing parent-child derivative citizenship should account for how
these laws have operated in conjunction with the military’s racialized marriage
policies and practices. However, the details of this phenomenon are extremely
complex and are still being developed in the secondary literature, making their
inclusion in the brief particularly challenging given the very strict filing
deadlines and space limitations that come with Supreme Court litigation.40

35

See SUSAN ZEIGER, ENTANGLING ALLIANCES: FOREIGN WAR BRIDES AND AMERICAN
SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 2 (2010).
36 See War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (providing non-quota immigrant
status to alien spouses and minor children of members of the armed forces serving during
World War II); GI Fiancees Act of June 29, 1946, 60 Stat. 339 (providing special
immigration status to the fiancees of World War II armed services members). Starting in
1947, Congress provided a series of time-limited waivers to racial immigration restrictions
that had been incorporated into the earlier war brides acts to the exclusion of Asian war
brides. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1947, ch. 289, 60 Stat. 401. However, couples seeking
such waivers had only thirty days in which to wed, making them of limited practical
significance. See ZEIGER, supra note 35, at 181-82.
37 See ZEIGER, supra note 35, at 213, 222-25.
38 See id. at 182-83.
39 Congress belatedly provided preferred immigration status for Amerasian children of
American soldiers with the Amerasian Immigration Amendments. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(f)
(1982) (extending “preferential treatment” in immigrant visa allocation to children fathered
by U.S. citizens and born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand after 1950 and
before October 22, 1982).
40 Linda Kerber has begun this important work in a recently published essay. See Linda
K. Kerber, Birthright Citizenship: The Vulnerability and Resilience of an American
Constitutional Principle, in JACQUELINE BHABHA, CHILDREN WITHOUT A STATE: A GLOBAL

1494

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91: 1485

In addition, it is not at all clear that a majority of the sitting justices would
consider it a problem, as a constitutional matter, that our citizenship laws
insulate male soldiers and the United States from citizenship claims by or on
behalf of nonmarital foreign-born children, regardless of the racial dimension
of the phenomenon. In Nguyen v. INS, for example, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion refers to the significant numbers of nonmarital children
fathered by U.S. servicemen as a reason to uphold the limitations on fatherchild derivative citizenship, rather than as a reason to be skeptical of the
validity of these limitations under modern equal protection principles.41 And
in a Ninth Circuit case raising a similar issue, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld was
quite candid in his assessment that Congress was well within its constitutional
authority to pass a statute that would minimize the burdens created by
“paternity and citizenship claims” asserted by “the women the [U.S.] soldiers
left behind and their children.”42 “This may not be pretty,” he noted, “but it is
a rational basis for a sex distinction.”43 In a world where that kind of
reasoning is acceptable – in at least some judicial circles – focusing on the fact
that the sexual and marital practices of U.S. soldiers abroad have been shaped
in part by race-salient government policies seemed more likely to confuse than
convince.44
On a closely related note, the amicus brief is also selective in how it
characterizes the sex-based injury caused by the federal citizenship statutes at
issue. Throughout, the brief urges that the gender-asymmetrical regulation of
parent-child derivative citizenship is unconstitutional because, by recognizing
and prescribing parental roles along sex lines, it effectively circumscribes
men’s and women’s liberty interests as citizen-parents.45 That is certainly true,
and hence the statutory scheme at issue in Flores-Villar runs afoul of
constitutional sex-equality principles articulated most recently in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, where the Court found that statesponsored perpetuation of gender-traditional parental roles violates equal
protection.46

HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE 255 (2011).
41 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
42 United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting). Linda Kerber provides a careful and contextualized discussion of Judge
Kleinfeld’s reasoning in The Stateless as the Citizen’s Other: A View from the United States,
112 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 6 (2007).
43 Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1129.
44 A recent empirical study suggests that combining race and sex discrimination claims is
unwise as a strategic matter. See Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at
Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1458 (2009) (observing disproportionately
high loss rates for individuals who bring discrimination claims based on more than one type
of discrimination).
45 Infra Brief of Professors, at 1499, 1507, 1515 (original at 4, 20, 37).
46 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003). For a discussion of this aspect of the Court’s reasoning in
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But there is another important dimension of the injury caused by the laws at
issue in Flores-Villar that is underdeveloped in the brief. By restricting
derivative citizenship as between American fathers and their nonmarital
foreign-born children, federal citizenship law perpetuates a system of sexual
ethics that privileges men’s sexual prerogative outside marriage.47 The foreign
mothers of nonmarital children fathered by Americans are left facing the
burdens and social stigma of unwed motherhood alone. In this regard, FloresVillar implicated the anti-subordination theory of constitutional sex equality –
the notion that anti-discrimination principles are not simply intended to remedy
a history of wrongful “classification,” but should also repudiate gender-based
sociolegal hierarchies that have resulted in women’s subordination.48 This
aspect of the operation of our gender-asymmetrical citizenship laws was
suggested in passing during oral argument in Nguyen v. INS, when Justice
Ginsburg noted wryly, “[t]here are . . . men out there who are being Johnny
Appleseed.”49 In her dissenting opinion in that case, Justice O’Connor
articulated a similar concern, observing that our sex-based citizenship laws are
“paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and
freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”50
After careful consideration, however, I decided not to emphasize this line of
analysis in the amicus brief, for two reasons. First, that formulation of the
injury is a poor fit with the facts of Flores-Villar. Ruben was raised in his
American father’s American household from infancy – a fact that makes the
government’s refusal to recognize him as a citizen particularly troubling.51
Second, as discussed above, given some jurists’ apparent acceptance of a
statutory regime that protects American men from paternity claims by
nonmarital foreign-born children, and in a doctrinal world in which the
majority of the current justices seem more comfortable with the roleprescription logic of the sex-equality doctrine, it seemed prudent to tailor the
characterization of sex-based injury accordingly.
***
Despite the difficult choices that had to be made in drafting the amicus brief
reprinted below, my hope is that it not only demonstrates that the laws that

Hibbs, see Reva B. Siegel, “You’ve Come A Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach
to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006).
47 Collins, supra note 25, at 1700.
48 The anti-subordination and anti-classification theories of equal protection have been
discussed by a host of legal scholars. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 32, 38 (1987); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003).
49 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071);
see Kerber, supra note 42, at 6.
50 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
51 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 2.
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were at issue in Flores-Villar are part of this nation’s “long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination,”52 but also illustrates how those laws implicate
central – if contested – commitments regarding both sex equality and
citizenship. As a sex-equality case, Flores-Villar raised important and
complicated questions regarding men’s and women’s individual liberty to
define themselves as parents – free of state-endorsed sex roles – and also
illuminated the government’s role in supporting a system of sexual ethics that
should have no place in a modern constitutional democracy. As a case about
citizenship, Flores-Villar raised important questions concerning how America
defines and designs itself as a nation. The concept of citizenship necessarily
implies a political community premised on inclusion and exclusion. And
despite important developments in international human rights law, the nationstate remains the primary site for the development and enforcement of
individual rights. Precisely because national citizenship status continues as a
vital source of individual rights and responsibilities, our constitutional
commitment to equal protection of the laws should apply with full force when
determining who is and who is not a citizen of the United States. Early
twentieth-century feminists understood this fundamental point with respect to
sex equality. The historians' amicus brief served its primary purpose if it
conveyed that basic message to its readers on the Court.

52 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae listed in the Appendix are professors of history, political
science, and law with particular expertise in the history of citizenship and
gender. Amici have a professional interest in ensuring that the Court is fully
and accurately informed regarding the historical scope of the law of citizenship
and the manner in which that law has been shaped and animated by sex-based
stereotypes and outdated gender norms.

1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Counsel of record for both parties
received notice at least 10 days prior to the due date of amici’s intention to file this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel for a party (nor
a party itself) made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission
of this brief. No person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to
its preparation or submission.
[Editors’ Note: this brief has been modified in form to fit the style of the Boston
University Law Review. As such, internal cross-references have been updated. The brief
has not otherwise been altered.]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sex-based laws premised on outdated or archaic presumptions about the
proper roles of men and women run afoul of well-established constitutional
principles, especially when such laws enforce gender-differentiated parental
roles. Amici write to elaborate on the history of Congress’s use of sex-based
classifications in the regulation of citizenship. Amici demonstrate that, in its
regulation of intergenerational and interspousal citizenship transmission,
Congress has consistently relied on and perpetuated sex-based norms
concerning proper parental roles, even when those norms have changed in
other contexts and in social practice. As this brief shows, Congress’s tendency
to regulate citizenship law using anachronistic gender stereotypes is readily
apparent in the statutes that govern the citizenship rights of parents of
nonmarital foreign-born children.
Historically, the notion that the husband was the legal and political head of
the marital family was the single most powerful belief to shape the United
States’ regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship. That principle has informed
every aspect of the citizen transmission statutes, including the parental
residency requirement at issue here. With respect to married citizen parents,
the headship principle led to dramatic differences in the rights of citizen fathers
versus mothers to confer citizenship on their foreign-born children. While
married citizen fathers could transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children
starting in 1790, it was nearly 150 years before Congress recognized the right
of any married citizen mothers to do the same.
Outside the bonds of marriage, a mirror opposite pattern prevailed.
According to powerful sex-based cultural assumptions, mothers bore full
responsibility for children born out of wedlock; fathers played no role in
rearing their nonmarital children. Based on these now-archaic assumptions,
Congress substantially limited citizenship transmission between citizen fathers
and their foreign-born nonmarital children in ways unrelated to the need to
ascertain the existence of a biological or meaningful father-child relationship.
These limitations persist today. At the same time, Congress was – and
continues to be – solicitous of the citizenship claims of nonmarital foreignborn children of citizen mothers.
The historical sources are brimming with evidence of the sex-based
assumptions that have animated U.S. citizenship law and that continue to do
so. By contrast, those sources contain little evidence that the minimal parental
U.S. residency requirement for nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen
mothers was predicated on a particular concern about the risk of statelessness
for those children. Moreover, to the extent statelessness was a concern,
Congress’s response was itself shaped by preconceived notions about the
respective roles of men and women in rearing their nonmarital children.
ARGUMENT
This Court has recognized time and again that laws that distinguish between
men and women based on outdated understandings of their “respective roles”
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or “separate spheres” are contrary to constitutional gender-equality principles.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). To be sure, this Court has by no means foreclosed the ability
of legislatures to draw sex-based distinctions. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001). But one undeniable theme of these decisions is that such
distinctions are suspect whenever they presume distinctive societal roles for
the sexes, both vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis their children. See, e.g., id. at
73; Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003).
In the decision below, the Court of Appeals concluded that the differential
parental residency requirements contained in the citizenship statutes in
question, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 and § 1409, do not rest on or perpetuate sex-based
stereotypes. Amici respectfully disagree. A careful reconstruction of the
history of U.S. citizenship law reveals the actual and archaic source of the
statutory discrimination at issue. Especially with respect to nonmarital
children, Congress has presumed that women are the primary caretakers of
such children and that a child accordingly has a different and stronger bond
with its mother than with its father. By codifying this and other sex-based
assumptions into citizenship laws, Congress has persistently enforced
stereotypical views about women as mothers, and men as fathers, long after
such views have eroded in other areas of law and practice. See, e.g., Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 731 (invalidating state laws attributable to the “pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work”).
I. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF INTERGENERATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
TRANSMISSION HISTORICALLY PRIVILEGED MARRIED CITIZEN FATHERS’
RIGHTS AND SEVERELY LIMITED THE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF MARRIED
CITIZEN MOTHERS.
A.

The Rights of Married Citizen Fathers Under the Citizenship Laws

Historically, the husband’s position as “head of the household” enhanced
men’s cultural, political, and legal authority in myriad contexts beyond the
household itself.2 Citizenship law was no exception. See Nancy F. Cott,
Marriage and Women’s Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934, 103 Am.

2 See generally Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he civil law . . . has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman. . . . So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the
founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and
representative in the social state.”); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth
Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981-87, 99397, 1019-22 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People] (explaining that the husband’s
authority in the household provided a foundation for men’s civic participation as voters,
jurors, and office holders, and a justification for women’s exclusion from those activities).
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Hist. Rev. 1440, 1452 (1998); Virginia Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and
Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States, 13
Pol. & Soc’y 1, 11 (1984). Accordingly, the laws governing jus sanguinis
citizenship privileged the father as the source of citizenship for foreign-born
children from 1790, when the first citizenship statute was enacted, until 1934.
See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (“Act of 1855”); Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1
Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104. The male
headship principle was so powerful that even ambiguous statutory language in
the citizenship statutes of 1790, 1795, and 1802 – which referred only to
transmission of citizenship to “children of citizens” or “persons” – was
generally understood to mean the children of citizen fathers. See 2 James
Kent, Commentaries on American Law *53 (8th ed. 1854).3
In the mid-nineteenth century, Congress considered a proposal to repudiate
the sex bias in the early jus sanguinis citizenship statutes. See Cong. Globe,
30th Cong. 1st Sess. 827 (1848) (statement of Sen. Webster) (proposing a bill
to confer citizenship on all foreign-born children “of a father or mother being
or having been a natural born citizen of the United States”). Instead, in 1855
Congress affirmed the husband-favoring interpretation. Rewording the statute
to clarify that only children “whose fathers were or shall be at the time of their
birth citizens of the United States, shall be deemed . . . citizens of the United
States,” Act of 1855, § 1, 10 Stat. at 604 (emphasis added), Congress codified
in citizenship law the well-established norm of male headship of the marital
family. See Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship
in U.S. History 234-35 (1997) (noting that the 1855 Act was “true to the law’s
pervasive patriarchalism”).
In keeping with social and legal norms privileging the father as the source of
citizenship for dependents in the marital household, Congress also pronounced
in 1855 that a non-citizen woman would become an American citizen simply
by marrying an American man. Act of 1855, § 2, 10 Stat. at 604. A primary
advocate of this change, Representative Cutting of New York, justified it in
terms of the “merger” doctrine: “[B]y the act of marriage itself the political
character of the wife shall at once conform to the political character of the

3

It was possible to interpret the early citizenship transmission statutes more restrictively
to mean that only foreign-born children of two citizen parents would acquire citizenship.
See 2 Kent, supra, *53; see also Horace Binney, The Alienigenae of the United States, 2
Am. L. Reg. 193, 207 (1854). However, as Kent observed, the understanding that citizen
fathers could convey citizenship to their foreign-born children regardless of the mother’s
citizenship was consistent with the requirement in all of the early citizenship statutes that
“the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never resided
within the United States.” Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; see also Act
of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103,
104; 2 Kent, supra, *53. That interpretation was also consistent with English law on the
point. See 2 Kent, supra, *51 (citing 4 Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731)).
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husband.” Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1853) (statement of Rep.
Cutting). Cutting assured his fellow congressmen that “there can be no
objection to” such a law “because women possess no political rights” of their
own. Id.
Congress continued to shape the laws governing intergenerational and
interspousal citizenship transmission according to the principle of male
headship even as the social and legal foundations of that principle began to
erode.4 Thus, when Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1922, eliminating the
American man’s absolute privilege to endow his foreign wife with citizenship
simply by marrying her, it continued to reify the male headship principle in
citizenship law in other ways. Congress expedited the naturalization process
for foreign wives of American citizens, Act of Sept. 22, 1922 (Cable Act), ch.
411, § 2, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022, exempted men’s foreign wives from racial
quotas, and otherwise gave them preferential immigration status. Act of May
26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a), 4(d), 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 155, 162. As discussed
below, the American woman who married a foreign husband never received
such preferential treatment; instead, for many decades she would be
expatriated for marrying a foreigner. See infra at 1502-03.
In short, the law governing citizenship transmission reflected and
perpetuated prevailing social and legal norms that secured men’s place as head
of the marital family and household. Well into the twentieth century, national
legislators presumed that the husband determined the political and cultural
character of his dependents – wife and children included – and, hence, that the
dependents’ citizenship should conform to his. Even in the face of significant
changes in married women’s legal status, these presumptions continued to
inform citizenship law until they were gradually and imperfectly dislodged.
B.

The Rights of Married Citizen Mothers Under the Citizenship Laws

The same norms that informed married fathers’ power to transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born children conversely led to substantial
limitations on the citizenship rights of married mothers. Under the doctrine of
coverture, wives had no independent civil or legal identity – they were “dead”
in the eyes of the law. See Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women,

4

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, laws giving husbands power over
their wives’ legal and economic personae were gradually revised by state legislatures and
courts under pressure from advocates. In the 1840s and 1850s, states began to pass married
women’s property acts, allowing women to retain some control over their separate property
obtained before marriage, and, slightly later, statutes affording wives the right to their own
earnings. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Geo.
L.J. 1359, 1398-1401 (1983); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights
Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1083 (1994).
During this period, women began to obtain public law rights as well, including the right to
vote. See T.A. Larson, Woman Suffrage in Western America, 38 Utah Hist. Q. 8, 19 (1970);
U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
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Marriage, and Property in Nineteenth-Century New York 50-55 (1982). A
wife’s legal and political identity was subsumed into that of her husband. That
principle was pervasive, shaping the political and legal rights of women –
married and unmarried – and the social expectations imposed upon them.5
Even as these powerful social and legal norms were challenged and lost hold
in other areas of law, see supra note 4, they continued to inform Congress’s
restriction of married women’s citizenship rights. Three examples are
especially germane.
First, the principle of male headship was integrated into American
citizenship law through the expatriation of American women who married noncitizen husbands. This had not been the common law practice. See Shanks v.
Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830) (Story, J.) (“[M]arriage with an alien,
whether a friend or an enemy, produces no dissolution of the native allegiance
of the wife.”); Candice Lewis Bredbenner, A Nationality of her Own: Women,
Marriage, and the Law of Citizenship 59 (1998). In the late nineteenth century,
however, some courts began expatriating American women who married noncitizens. Thus, in 1883 a federal court held that an American woman lost her
citizenship upon marriage to a non-citizen, declaring that “legislation upon the
subject of naturalization is constantly advancing towards the idea that the
husband, as the head of the family, is to be considered its political
representative.” Pequignot v. City of Detroit, 16 F. 211, 216 (C.C.E.D. Mich.
1883).
Consistent with its tendency to enhance, rather than minimize, the sexdiscriminatory function of the citizenship laws, Congress codified the
Pequignot holding in the Expatriation Act of 1907, which stipulated that “any
American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her
husband.” Act of Mar. 2, 1907 (Expatriation Act), ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228,
1228. Affirming the constitutionality of that Act eight years later, this Court
observed that “[t]he identity of the husband and wife is an ancient principle of
our jurisprudence [which] worked in many instances for her protection [and
which] give[s] dominance to the husband.” Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311 (1915). As Senator Cable later explained, “for centuries male legislatures
and jurists” used America’s “grossly unjust” citizenship laws to “jealously
preserve[] the husband’s dominance and . . . limit[] the wife to a negligible
sphere of activity and assign[] her to an inconspicuous position in the eyes of

5 Because it was assumed that a married woman operated under her husband’s influence
and lacked independent will, married women could neither execute contracts nor file suit to
defend their rights and property without their husbands’ official participation in the lawsuit.
See Basch, supra, 51. Similar logic deprived all women of the vote and barred them from
jury service and office holding, even if they were unmarried. See Siegel, She the People,
981-86, 993-97. Under the strict common law, a married woman also lacked the right to
custody of her children in the event of separation from or death of the husband – a limitation
that changed slowly in the nineteenth century. See Michael Grossberg, Governing the
Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 235 (1985).
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the law.” American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing on S. 992, S. 2760,
S. 3968, and S. 4169 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Immigration, 72d
Cong. 25 (1933).
After the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women’s
opposition to the Expatriation Act gained force. See Bredbenner, supra, 81;
Cott, 103 Am. Hist. Rev. at 1464; Sapiro, 13 Pol. & Soc’y at 13. But not all
agreed that women’s suffrage paved the way for equal citizenship rights.
Resistance was predicated on a persistent valuing of male headship and
“marital unity,” which presupposed that a wife must and would conform to the
cultural and political character of the husband. See 62 Cong. Rec. 9061 (1922)
(statement of Rep. Mills) (by allowing American women to retain their
citizenship upon marriage to a non-citizen, “you violate . . . the existing legal
principle of family unity.”).
In 1922, Congress enacted the Cable Act, which ended the automatic
expatriation of some, but not all, American women who married non-citizens.
Cable Act, ch. 411, § 3, 42 Stat. at 1022. Congress’s equalization of women’s
citizenship through the Cable Act was equivocal. The law continued to
expatriate any American woman who married a non-citizen and resided in her
husband’s country for two years, or abroad in any other country for five years.
Id. No such limitation has ever applied to an American man who opted to live
abroad with his non-citizen wife. Moreover, the Cable Act’s sex-equality
principle did not extend to those women whose foreign husbands were
themselves “ineligible to citizenship” under our naturalization laws. Id. §§ 3,
5, 42 Stat. at 1022; see also Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 641, 662, 694 n.335
(2005). Thus, under the Cable Act the American woman who married a
racially ineligible non-citizen was still expatriated. See Linda K. Kerber, No
Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship
42-43 (1998). No such draconian penalty was visited upon an American man
who did the same. See Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, §§ 4(a), 4(d), 13(c), 43
Stat. 153, 155, 162.
Second, until 1934 the male headship principle also prevented recognition of
married American women’s capacity to transmit citizenship to their foreignborn children. See Bredbenner, supra, 84. As discussed above, prior to 1855,
the citizenship statutes were interpreted to preclude transmission of citizenship
from the married American mother to her foreign-born children. See Act of
Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat. 153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1
Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104; see also supra
at 1500. Congress affirmed and codified that interpretation in the citizenship
statute enacted in 1855. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604,
604.
Even after the enactment of the Cable Act in 1922, married women were
unable to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. Strong resistance
to equalization of that right was premised largely on the belief that the husband
determined the political and cultural character of the family. See Relating to
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Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of Mothers Who Are
Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain
Distinctions in Matters of Nationality: Hearings on H.R. 5489 Before the H.
Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 72d Cong. 18 (1932) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 5489] (Statement of Sen. Green) (“I am still constrained to
believe that the man is the head of the family.”); Relating to the Naturalization
and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are Citizens of the United
States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of
Nationality, Hearings on H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 Before the H. Comm. on
Immigration and Naturalization, 73d Cong. 29 (1933) [hereinafter Hearings on
H.R. 3673] (statement of Lieut. Col. Fred B. Ryons) (objecting to citizenship
transmission by married mothers on the ground that “[t]he head of the family .
. . has a perfect right and has an obligation as the head of the family to rule his
family”). It was not until 1934 that Congress finally recognized the right of
American wives to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. See Act
of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, 797.
Third, even after Congress introduced formal statutory equality with respect
to wives’ ability to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children, beliefs
about married women’s lack of authority and individual identity within
marriage continued to shape the citizenship laws in significant ways. Indeed,
the equalization of the law regarding married mothers’ and fathers’ right to
transmit citizenship in 1934 prompted Congress to introduce a child U.S.
residency requirement, see Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. at 797,
and a lengthy age-delimited parental U.S. residency requirement for children
of mixed-nationality couples, see Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 201(g),
54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40; see also supra note 3 (noting minimal U.S. residency
requirement for fathers prior to 1934).
Although sex-neutral in their wording, the child and parental U.S. residency
requirements were not sex-neutral in their origins or statutory design.
Repeatedly in the debates over the 1934 and 1940 acts, legislators and
witnesses articulated a concern that the foreign-born children of American
women in mixed-nationality marriages would not be “American” in character
because the foreign husband would establish the character of his dependents.
In 1933, an Assistant Secretary of State articulated this shared understanding:
“It is hardly necessary to say that, when a woman having American nationality
marries a man having the nationality of a foreign country and establishes her
home with him in his country, the national character of that country is likely to
be stamped upon the children, so that from the standpoint of the United States
they are essentially alien in character.” See Letter from Assistant Secretary of
State Wilbur J. Carr to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization, reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 3673 at 9.
The belief that the wife and children conformed to the foreign husband’s
cultural practices and political views first led to the inclusion of a five-year
age-delimited child U.S. residency requirement in the 1934 Act. See Act of
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May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. at 797. A 1938 letter by a cabinet-level
committee appointed by President Roosevelt explained this series of events:
Congress apparently took into consideration the fact that persons born in
foreign countries whose fathers were nationals of those countries would
be likely to have stronger ties with the foreign country than with the
United States, and consequently annexed as a condition for retaining
citizenship a 5-year period of residence [for the child] in this country
between the ages of 13 and 18.
86 Cong. Rec. 11,945 (1940) (letter dated June 1, 1938 from Sec. of State
Cordell Hull, Att’y Gen. Homer Cummings, and Sec. of Labor Frances
Perkins) (emphasis added).
After the 1934 Act went into effect, however, there was concern that the
child residency requirement improperly limited transmission of citizenship to
the foreign-born children of American citizen fathers who were married to
non-citizens. Such children were believed to conform to the cultural and
political character of the American “head of the family” – a legal term of art
that, in this period, referred to the husband/father.6 The same cabinet-level
committee explained that “these [child] residence requirements will impose
great hardship in some cases,” especially where the “head of the family”
worked abroad for the American government or an American enterprise of
some sort. Id. Thus, it recommended an exemption from the child residency
requirement in such cases. The committee also recommended the imposition
of a new requirement that the citizen parent in a mixed-nationality marriage
“should have resided at least 10 years in the United States prior to the birth of
the child,” which, again, would not apply to those foreign-born children of
families where the “head of the family” was an American citizen employed by
an American enterprise. Id.
As a consequence of these sex-based assumptions about parental roles in
marriage, in 1940 Congress re-configured the citizenship transmission statute
in a manner that would help preserve husbands’ power and privilege while
disproportionately constraining married women’s ability to transmit citizenship
to their foreign-born children. The resulting exception to the residency
requirements was phrased to relieve the children of citizen fathers from the
onerous child and parental residency requirements, while severely diminishing
the likelihood that the children of citizen mothers would benefit from it. The
exception was triggered only when the citizen parent “at the time of the child’s
birth [was] residing abroad solely or principally in the employment of the
Government of the United States or a bona fide American . . . organization . . .
for which he receives substantial compensation.” Nationality Act of 1940, ch.
876, § 201(g), 54 Stat. at 1139 (emphasis added). In the 1940s, married
women with children were rarely engaged in such employment, especially not

6 See, e.g., Cyclopedic Law Dictionary 522 (3d ed. 1940) (defining “head of a family” in
terms of the relationship between “father and child” or “husband and wife”).
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“at the time of [her] child’s birth,” and hence the exception was of little use to
citizen mothers.7 Even the details of the parental residency requirement thus
evince the imprint of the male headship principle and the corresponding belief
that the wife and children conformed to the cultural and political character of
the husband.
In short, the profound limitations on the citizenship rights of married women
– including their right to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children –
were corollaries to the sex-differentiated norm that empowered married men to
transmit citizenship to their wives and foreign-born children. Congress’s
regulation of jus sanguinis and derivative citizenship not only reflected those
sex-based norms, but extended their vitality in citizenship law even as similar
sex-based distinctions were eroding in other contexts.
II. SEX-BASED GENERALIZATIONS ANIMATED – AND CONTINUE TO
ANIMATE – THE DISPARATE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED CITIZEN
FATHERS AND MOTHERS.
Outside the bonds of marriage, a mirror opposite pattern of sex-based
regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship prevailed. Courts, administrators, and
Congress have readily recognized citizenship claims of the foreign-born
children of unmarried citizen mothers, and Congress imposed only a minimal
parental residency requirement in such cases. By contrast, transmission of
citizenship between fathers and their nonmarital foreign-born children was,
and is, severely limited.
At first glance, this system may appear to be in tension with the maleprivileging norm that operated in the marital context, but the two systems were
shaped by the same constellation of sex-based social norms. The man’s
headship over his marital family was a right and privilege linked to his control
over and responsibilities for his dependents. But the man who fathered a child
outside of marriage was presumed to have no relationship with or
responsibility for his child. Meanwhile, the woman who had a child out of
wedlock experienced the social ignominy of and bore full responsibility for the
child.
Through its regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, Congress reinforced and
perpetuated these gendered norms regarding men’s and women’s respective
roles and responsibilities as parents outside marriage. By codifying a system
of citizenship laws that enforced sex-differentiated family roles, Congress
constrained individual mothers’ and fathers’ ability to decide how to perform
their roles as parents. The statutory provision at issue in this case continues
7 Women seeking employment abroad as Foreign Service officers faced almost
insurmountable sex discrimination. See Homer L. Calkin, Women in American Foreign
Affairs 102-103, 110 (1977). Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, working women were
often lawfully dismissed during pregnancy, and few had access to maternity leave or job
security after the birth of a child. See Alice Kessler-Harris, In Pursuit of Equity: Women,
Men and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in 20th-Century America 210-11 (2001).
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this transparently sex-discriminatory means of regulating citizenship
transmission, even as the social and legal norms regarding nonmarital
parenthood have evolved.
A.

Citizenship Transmission from Citizen Fathers to Nonmarital Children

Premised on the outdated view that fathers have only attenuated
relationships with their nonmarital children and that the government should
recognize such relationships only in extremely limited circumstances, U.S.
citizenship laws have consistently encumbered citizenship transmission from
citizen fathers to their nonmarital children.
For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, domestic relations
laws generally insulated men from their nonmarital children by disfavoring
those children’s claims to property and status, even when the children had been
legitimated. See Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the
Family in Nineteenth-Century America 221-22, 232-33 (1985).8 Well into the
early twentieth century, domestic relations laws in most states resisted
recognition of the father-child relationship outside of marriage and
demonstrated solicitousness for putative fathers who wished to avoid their
parental responsibilities. See id. at 199, 217, 231-32. These laws both evinced
and perpetuated powerful cultural resistance to men’s responsibility for – and
relationships with – their nonmarital children.
Such resistance also shaped the regulation of jus sanguinis citizenship, even
before Congress first addressed the citizenship status of foreign-born
nonmarital children in 1940. From 1790 until 1940, the citizenship statutes
were silent as to the marital status of the citizen parent. See Act of Feb. 10,
1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604, 604; Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 4, 2 Stat.
153, 155; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415; Act of Mar. 26,
1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 104. Nevertheless, these statutes were interpreted to
allow transmission of citizenship to the marital children of citizen fathers, but
not to their illegitimate children. The lead nineteenth-century case in this area,
Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864), demonstrates just how rigid this limitation
was. In Guyer, the father had recognized his children, given them his name,
and named them in his will. Yet the court refused to recognize their claims to
legitimacy, and thus to citizenship. See Guyer, 22 Md. at 249 (finding that the
citizen father’s children were “illegitimate; under our law nullius filii, and
clearly therefore not within the provisions of the [1802] Act”).
Courts and administrators gradually recognized the citizenship claims of at
least some nonmarital foreign-born children who had been legitimated by the
citizen father. See 32 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 164-65 (1920); House Comm. on
8 Under the common law, a nonmarital child was nullius filius.
The law did not
recognize a legal relationship between the child and either of his parents. See 2 Kent, supra,
*212; see also Wilfrid Hooper, The Law of Illegitimacy 25, 122, 135 (1911) (the nonmarital
child had no right to inherit, no right to the surname of either parent, and no claim on them
for support or education).
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Immigration & Naturalization, 76th Cong., Report Proposing a Revision and
Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States, Part One: Proposed
Code with Explanatory Comments 17 (Comm. Print 1939) [hereinafter
Proposed Code]. But the legitimation exception was narrow and uncertain,
with courts and administrators erecting a high bar when assessing citizenship
claims asserted by or on behalf of the nonmarital children of citizen fathers.
See, e.g., Mason ex rel Chen Suey v. Tillinghast, 26 F.2d 588 (1st Cir. 1928)
(affirming rejection of evidence of legitimation for purposes of determining
citizenship of foreign-born nonmarital child of American father); Ng Suey Hi v.
Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1927) (holding that “illegitimate children,
born abroad of citizens, being nullius filii” are not citizens under the
citizenship statute, and rejecting evidence of legitimation by American father);
Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 612 (1915)
(“[I]t seems clear that illegitimate half-castes born in semi-barbarous countries
of American fathers and native women are not American citizens.”).
In 1934, Congress had the opportunity to introduce sex equality into the
laws governing jus sanguinis citizenship for nonmarital children, but it refused
to do so. The sex-based understanding that that men played an attenuated and
discretionary role in the lives of their nonmarital children provided crucial
context for the legislative debates over citizenship transmission to such
children. Bills introduced in the early 1930s would have secured parental sex
equality with respect to transmission of citizenship to foreign-born children of
citizen parents, regardless of the parents’ marital status:
Any child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, born out of the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother may be at the
time of the birth of such child a citizen of the United States, is declared to
be a citizen of the United States; but the right of citizenship shall not
descend to any child whose father or mother had never resided in the
United States previous to the birth of such child.
H.R. 14,684, 71st Cong. § 3 (1930) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 5489, 72d
Cong. (1931).
Supporters of this bill urged that equal treatment of the citizen mothers and
fathers of nonmarital foreign-born children was warranted pursuant to the sexequality principles that informed the 1922 Cable Act. This included the
principle that mothers and fathers should have equal rights to confer
citizenship to their nonmarital children, and equal responsibility for such
children. See Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 3-5. (Statement of Burnita Shelton
Matthews); id. at 17-19 (Statement of Laura Berrien); see also Kristin Collins,
Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal
Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 Yale L.J. 1669, 1693-98 (2000).
Importantly, the proponents of sex equality in citizenship laws were aware
that, in the context of the nonmarital child, proof of paternity would be
required. They stressed that procedures would have to be adopted in order to
ensure that the child was, indeed, the child of the citizen father. See Hearings
on H.R. 5489 at 6 (Statement of Burnita Shelton Matthews) (“We may rest
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assured, it seems to me, that adequate proof is required before the right to the
protection of the country is afforded. It is unlikely that any person entitled to
protection under this bill would get it unless proof were conclusive.”). But,
beyond that, they sought equal treatment of mothers and fathers in the
transmission of citizenship to nonmarital foreign-born children. Id. at 3-5, 1718.
Nevertheless, opponents resisted sex-equality in the regulation of jus
sanguinis citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children not primarily
because they were worried about fraud, but because it offended the deeply-held
view that the law did not – and should not – recognize the relationship of the
father and his nonmarital child. As one congressman explained in an exchange
with a proponent of the bill: “The child cannot inherit. It would not do, if he
could. You are trying to undo what practically all of the big States in the
country have held to be the proper procedure (to give to this child
consideration) but you are giving an illegitimate child consideration.”
Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 5 (statement of Rep. Jenkins). These concerns, as
well as stubborn resistance to full gender equality in matters relating to
citizenship, were fatal to the inclusion of “illegitimate” in the bill. See
Bredbenner, supra, 230-31; Collins, 109 Yale L.J. at 1697. As a consequence,
when Congress in 1934 passed a statute enabling married mothers to transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born children, the final version of the bill said
nothing concerning parental marital status, but was understood to apply to the
foreign-born children of married citizen parents only. See 78 Cong. Rec. 7357
(1934) (“[This bill] applies to the children of wives and the children of
husbands.”) (statement of Rep. Jenkins); 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 290, 291 (1939)
(recognizing “that the applicable statutory provisions [in the citizenship laws]
apply only to legitimate children”).9
Six years later, Congress finally addressed the citizenship status of foreignborn nonmarital children, making explicit what had been understood for
decades: American citizenship law would continue to distance fathers from
their nonmarital children. See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201(g) &
205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40. The Nationality Act of 1940 codified and carried
forward many of the pre-existing practices of courts and administrators. But it
also extended the law’s sex-based differential treatment of citizen parents by
imposing new limitations on transmission of citizenship from citizen fathers to
nonmarital foreign-born children through a host of requirements that did not
apply to citizen mothers: mandatory legitimation during the child’s minority; a
ten-year, age-delimited U.S. residency requirement for the father; and a fiveyear, age-delimited U.S. residency requirement for the child. Id.

9

Some sources suggested that the 1934 Act provided statutory authority for transmission
of citizenship to the foreign-born nonmarital child of a citizen mother. See In re M-----, 4 I.
& N. Dec. 440 (B.I.A. 1951); Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 99, 105 (1934).
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In 1952, Congress essentially re-codified this system, including the ten-year
age-delimited parental residency requirement that applied to citizen fathers of
foreign-born nonmarital children, but not to citizen mothers of such children.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, §§ 301(a)(7) & 309, 66
Stat. 163, 236-38. It was the 1952 version of this statute that was in effect in
1974 when Petitioner was born. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1970). Congress
has re-codified this basic statute with minor changes on several occasions since
then. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat.
3655, 3657. But despite advances in legal norms regarding fathers’ rights and
responsibilities with respect to their nonmarital children,10 Congress continues
to impose a significantly longer residency requirement on citizen fathers of
nonmarital children – even where, as here, the father has legitimated the child
and has raised him in his American home. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) & 1409(a)
(requiring that fathers of nonmarital foreign-born children satisfy a five-year
age-delimited U.S. residency requirement).
In short, consistent with its long-standing tendency, Congress has codified
particular and anachronistic sex-based norms concerning father-child relations
in the laws governing citizenship transmission to nonmarital foreign-born
children. It has done so notwithstanding the erosion of these norms in other
areas of law and in individual mothers’ and fathers’ everyday practices as
parents.
B.

Citizenship Transmission from Citizen Mothers to Nonmarital Children

The United States has been far more solicitous of the citizenship claims of
foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers than it has of claims of the
nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers. As a general matter, all
three branches of the U.S. government have consistently recognized the mother
as a source of citizenship for nonmarital, foreign-born children. The ready
recognition of the mother-child relationship reflects the sex-based assumption
that the mother, but not the father, bears the rights and responsibility of unwed
parenthood.11

10

See, e.g., Restatement 3d Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) § 2.5 (1999)
(“For purposes of intestate succession by, from, or through an individual . . . [a]n individual
is the child of his or her genetic parents, whether or not they are married to each other . . .
.”); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (prohibiting state from
distinguishing between unwed mothers and fathers solely on the basis of sex where the
father maintains a parent-child relationship).
11 In a departure from the strict common law principle of nullius filius, judges and
legislators in both England and America gradually began to acknowledge the mother-child
relationship outside marriage so as to ensure a responsible care provider and source of
material support. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 111 (1806) (Parsons, C.J.) (“[T]o
provide for [the bastard’s] support and education, the mother has a right to the custody and
control of him, and is bound to maintain him, as his natural guardian.”). As a consequence,
by the early twentieth-century, many of the limitations on the legal relationship between the
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Officials administering the citizenship laws generally recognized the
citizenship claims of foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers long
before Congress regulated the subject. See, e.g., Proposed Code at 18 (noting
that “the Department of State has, at least since 1912, uniformly held that an
illegitimate child born abroad of an American mother acquires at birth the
nationality of the mother”); Frederick Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United
States 49 (1904); Lester B. Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 99, 105 (1934) (citing a State Department memo of October 27, 1932).12
A 1939 House Committee report acknowledged this practice and explained
that it made sense in a social and legal environment in which, outside marriage,
the mother “stands in the place of the father.” Proposed Code at 18. That
often-used phrase functioned as a reference to the mother’s superior parental
rights and responsibilities with respect to her nonmarital children, and also
reflected a social and cultural belief that mothers, not fathers, sustained
relationships with nonmarital children. Hence, a 1939 Attorney General
Opinion notes that the exclusion of such children from the United States would
be “not only harsh, but largely impractical.” 39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 291.
In 1940, Congress codified the administrative practice of maternal
transmission of citizenship to nonmarital foreign-born children. Section 205 of
the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that if the “mother had the nationality of
the United States at the time of the child’s birth, and had previously resided in
the United States or one of its outlying possessions,” the child “shall be held to
have acquired at birth her nationality status.” See Nationality Act of 1940, ch.
876, § 205, 54 Stat. at 1139-40. Thus, unlike the transmission of citizenship to
the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers, citizenship transmission
between the citizen mother and nonmarital child was largely unencumbered.13
Citizen mothers who wished – or wish – to secure citizenship for their
nonmarital foreign-born children have never been required to provide proof of
maternity, pledge support for their minor children, satisfy a child residency

nonmarital child and his mother had been repealed. Grossberg, supra, 224-25. These
changes corresponded with a growing consensus that the mother was the natural and
presumed caretaker of her children – a cultural norm that strengthened mothers’ legal
custodial rights both in and out of marriage. Id. at 209, 225, 234-35.
12 But see 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 290, 290-91 (1939) (acknowledging that nonmarital
children of citizen mothers have been recognized as citizens, but finding that such children
do not fall within the text of existing legislation and that “resort to the Congress for
additional legislation is desirable”).
13 Indeed, the primary statutory limitation on transmission of citizenship between
American mothers and their nonmarital foreign-born children contained in the Nationality
Act of 1940 – that the child would take the citizenship of her American mother only “in the
absence of . . . legitimation” by the father – was deleted in the recodification of the
provision in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952. See Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 309, 66 Stat. at 238-39.
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requirement, or satisfy a lengthy age-delimited parental U.S. residency
requirement of the sort at issue in this case.14
The historical sources make clear that Congress’s solicitude for the
nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers had three primary
motivations. First, in 1940 Congress was engaged in a massive overhaul of the
country’s nationality laws, and it sought to standardize numerous
administrative practices that had not yet been codified. During this process,
Congress was aware of the State Department’s recognition of the citizenship of
nonmarital foreign-born children of American mothers. See Proposed Code,
supra, 18. Congress thus codified this long-standing, sex-based, extrastatutory practice.
Second, ready recognition of the mother as the source of jus sanguinis
citizenship for nonmarital children was consistent with the sex-based
presumption that mothers, not fathers, were the caretakers of nonmarital
children. Legislators who, as discussed above, were hostile toward proposals
to recognize citizenship claims of citizen fathers’ nonmarital foreign-born
children characterized the State Department’s recognition of nonmarital
foreign-born children of citizen mothers “as a great boon” for the
“unfortunate” mother. Hearings on H.R. 5489 at 5 (statement of Rep. Jenkins).
Third, at a time when nations around the globe were engaged in a concerted
effort to rationalize the laws governing citizenship and nationality, the
legislators and their advisors were mindful of the sex-based laws and policies
of other countries on the question of jus sanguinis citizenship of all children,
including nonmarital children. See Proposed Code at 18 (citing Durward V.
Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to
Loss of Nationality, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 248, 258-59 (1935)). Accordingly, it
appears that congressional recognition of the citizenship claims of the foreignborn children of unwed mothers was fortified by the fact that many other
countries had similar practices consistent with prevailing American sex-based
views about unmarried mothers’ and fathers’ legal and caregiving relationships
with their children. See Proposed Code at 18 (noting the rule that the mother
“stands in place of the father” for nonmarital children, that such a rule follows
Roman law and American domestic law, and that “the laws of some thirty
countries” recognize the citizenship status of nonmarital children of citizen
mothers).
In the case before the Court, the United States has argued that in 1940
Congress eased the conditions under which mothers transmit citizenship to
their foreign-born nonmarital children – and, in particular, exemption from the
ten-year age-delimited parental residency requirement – out of concern for the
risk of statelessness for that class of children. See Brief of United States,
United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445),
14

In 1952, Congress strengthened the parental residency requirement applicable to
citizen mothers of foreign-born nonmarital children, increasing it to one year. See
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 309(c), 66 Stat. at 238-39.
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2008 WL 1848810. Based on the historical sources, this assertion is overstated
and incomplete. For example, the primary legislative report on the 1940 Act
refers to the risk of statelessness with respect to “foundlings,” but not with
respect to the nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen mothers. Proposed
Code at 17-18. Proposed Section 203(c), codified in the 1940 Act as Section
204(c), provided that a “child of unknown parentage found in an outlying
possession of the United States” would have U.S. nationality until proven
otherwise. Id. The purpose of that provision, according to the report, was to
“prevent unfortunate persons of the class mentioned from being stateless.”
Proposed Code at 17. By contrast, the report’s remarks on proposed Section
204, which was to govern the transmission of citizenship from citizen parents
to their nonmarital foreign-born children, does not identify statelessness as a
concern.15
Moreover, to the extent that any legislators were focused on the risk of
statelessness to the foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen mothers in 1940
when they first created the statutory scheme, their attentiveness was selective
in ways that powerfully reflected and perpetuated the sex-based beliefs
concerning parental rights and responsibilities that have coursed through our
citizenship laws generally.
Nationality and statelessness were subjects of intense study and international
concern in the 1930s.16 The most important American work on the subject was
written by Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, a professor and the head of the
department of government at American University. See Catheryn SecklerHudson, Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (1934).17
Seckler-Hudson wrote about the risk of statelessness facing the foreign-born
nonmarital children of U.S. citizen mothers and fathers. See id. at 224-25.
As an initial matter, Seckler-Hudson was skeptical that, in 1934, the United
States would recognize foreign-born nonmarital children of citizen fathers as
American citizens, whether legitimated or not. See id. at 224 (“Legitimation
does not necessarily offer a remedy [for statelessness] for these children.”); id.
at 220-21 (citing Guyer v. Smith, 22 Md. 239 (1864)). Accordingly, she
observed that when such children were born in jus sanguinis countries in

15

Section 204 of the Proposed Code was codified as Section 205 of the 1940 Act.
Nationality law and the related subject of statelessness were primary subjects of
consideration at the First Conference for the Codification of International Law at The Hague
in 1930. See Manley O. Hudson, The First Conference for the Codification of International
Law, 24 Am. J. Int’l L. 447, 453 (1930).
17 Seckler-Hudson’s work was well known at the time of its publication and remained a
prominently cited source on statelessness. See, e.g., Ellery C. Stowell, Book Review, 30
Am. J. Int’l L. 170 (1936) (reviewing William O’Sullivan Molony, Nationality and the
Peace Treaties (1934)); Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and
“Permanent Allegiance”, 56 Yale L.J. 58, 69 n.67 (1946); Comment, The Expatriation Act
of 1954, 64 Yale L.J. 1164, 1196 n.161 (1955); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 161 n.15 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35 (1958).
16
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which they did not acquire nationality through the mother, they “had no
effective citizenship.” Id. at 221. Cf. William Samore, Statelessness as a
Consequence of the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 45 Am. J. Int’l L. 476, 479
(1951) (“[T]he unacknowledged child of an American father born of an alien
woman abroad would be stateless, providing the woman’s state does not
extend its nationality to the child.”).
In addition – and of particular significance in this case – Seckler-Hudson
noted the risk of statelessness for nonmarital children born to American fathers
who did not satisfy the parental residency requirement. See Seckler-Hudson,
supra, 220, 225 (“[T]he illegitimate child of a foreign-born father, the father
being an American citizen but never having resided in the United States, would
not be an American citizen” and “unless the country of his birth gave him its
nationality, he would be stateless”).18 The risks of statelessness for foreignborn nonmarital children of citizen fathers were thus well known when
Congress was considering the question of how to regulate citizenship
transmission to nonmarital foreign-born children.
Congress was presented with, but chose not to enact, a legislative proposal
that would have remedied the various risks of statelessness confronting
foreign-born children of American citizen mothers and fathers. In her treatise,
Seckler-Hudson described a sex-neutral and marriage-neutral citizenship
transmission bill that had been introduced in Congress. It was the very same
bill, described supra at 1508, introduced in the early 1930s that provided that
“[a]ny child, legitimate or illegitimate” born abroad of a citizen mother or
father was to be an American citizen, subject to a simple (and gender-neutral)
parental residency requirement. See Seckler-Hudson, supra, 222 (quoting H.R.
5489, 72d Cong. (1931)). Despite the fact that the leading authority on
statelessness endorsed such legislation, in 1940 and again in 1952 Congress
enacted legislation that perpetuated and even intensified the sex inequalities in
our jus sanguinis citizenship statutes by shoring up substantial barriers to
citizenship transmission between a citizen father and his nonmarital foreignborn child.
In sum, it is possible that Congress was concerned about statelessness when
it exempted unwed mothers from the lengthy parental residency requirement
that applied to unwed fathers. But if this was so, Congress acted on its concern
in a sex-discriminatory manner. Congress opted to ignore the acknowledged
risk of statelessness that confronted nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen

18

Seckler-Hudson did not specify whether she was referring to both legitimated and
unlegitimated children in this passage, but her view that the United States did not regularly
recognize the citizenship of nonmarital foreign-born children of citizen fathers regardless of
legitimation suggests that the difference was not dispositive to her views. See SecklerHudson, supra, 224. In addition, given that the parental residency requirement in 1934 was
of unspecified and minimal duration, see supra note 3, when Congress enacted the 1940 Act
with a 10-year age-delimited parental residency requirement, the risk Seckler-Hudson
observed would have increased significantly.
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fathers. It also opted to ignore a proposed legislative solution that would have
addressed any concern about statelessness in a more thorough, sex-neutral
manner. Thus, to the extent that Congress’s legislation in this area was
prompted by a concern about statelessness, that concern was filtered through
and premised on the same constellation of sex-based presumptions regarding
how men and women behave as parents that has characterized the United
States’ approach to citizenship transmission since 1790.
Laws premised on historically rooted sex-based assumptions concerning
how men and women behave as parents – and how they should behave – have
no place in the regulation of citizenship transmission today. Although
certainly many nonmarital children are raised exclusively or primarily by their
mothers, others – like Petitioner – are raised in their father’s household. Our
current domestic laws reflect these developments and eschew the antiquated
notion that the mother bears singular responsibility for the nonmarital child.
See supra note 10. It is no longer acceptable for Congress to enact laws that
enforce gender-differentiated family roles by limiting individuals’ rights as
parents through sex-based classifications. The historical record demonstrates,
however, that Congress has done just that in its regulation of jus sanguinis
citizenship. With respect to foreign-born nonmarital children, Congress
continues to enforce sex-based stereotypes and, in so doing, prolongs the
vitality of gender-traditional beliefs concerning men’s and women’s respective
roles as parents, even as such beliefs have eroded in other areas of law and in
our social practices.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
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